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Abstract
This study provides a growth-theoretic analysis of the e¤ects of intellectual prop-
erty rights on the take-o¤ of an economy from an era of stagnation to a state of
sustained economic growth. We incorporate patent protection into a Schumpeterian
growth model in which take-o¤ occurs when the population size crosses an endogenous
threshold. We nd that strengthening patent protection has contrasting e¤ects on
economic growth at di¤erent stages of development. Specically, it leads to an earlier
take-o¤ but also reduces economic growth in the long run.
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"England [...] by 1700 [...] had developed an e¢ cient set of property rights
embedded in the common law [and...] begun to protect private property in knowl-
edge with its patent law. The stage was now set for the industrial revolution."
North and Thomas (1973, p. 156)
1 Introduction
The di¤erential timing of countries experiencing a transition from stagnation to growth has
governed patterns of comparative economic development across the world and contributed
signicantly to the divergence in income across the world over the past two centuries.1 Given
the importance of intellectual property rights (IPR) to the pace of technological progress and
therefore to the transition from stagnation to growth, this study explores the role that the
patent system may have played in the pace of this transition and on economic growth in the
long run.
The UK experienced this transition during the late 18th/early 19th century. Figure 1
plots real GDP per capita in the UK.2 Figure 2 plots the log level of real GDP per capita,
in which the slope shows the growth rate of income. In the 18th century, income in the UK
grew very slowly. Specically, the average annual growth rate of income in the UK from
1701 to 1800 was 0.4%. Then, the average growth rate from 1801 to 1900 increased to 1.0%.
From the 20th century onwards, the average growth rate stabilized at about 1.7%.
Figure 1: Real GDP per capita in the UK from
1700 to 2016
Figure 2: Log of real GDP per capita in the
UK from 1700 to 2016
We incorporate patent protection into the Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous
take-o¤ in Peretto (2015). In this model, the economy rst experiences stagnation with zero
growth in output per capita when the market size is small. Here population size plays the
crucial role of determining the market size, which in turn implies that population growth
gives rise to an expansion of the market. As the market size becomes su¢ ciently large,
innovation takes place and the economy gradually experiences growth. In the long run, the
1For a discussion of the great divergence, see Pomeranz (2001).
2Data source: Maddison Project Database.
2
economy converges to a balanced growth path (BGP) with steady-state growth. Within this
growth-theoretic framework that is consistent with the growth pattern in Figure 1 and 2, we
obtain the following results.
Strengthening patent protection leads to an earlier take-o¤. Incentives for innovation
to take place depend on the market value of inventions, which in turn depends on the
level of patent protection and the market size. Therefore, when stronger patent protection
increases the market value of patents by reducing price competition and making rms more
protable, it also reduces the market size required for innovation to take place. As a result,
the economy starts to experience innovation and growth at an earlier time (i.e., an earlier
industrial revolution). Our nding that stronger IPR protection leads to an earlier (but
not necessarily immediate) take-o¤ is consistent with historical evidence on the e¤ects of
IPR on the industrial revolution.3 However, stronger patent protection eventually reduces
innovation and growth as recent studies tend to nd.4 Intuitively, although stronger patent
protection encourages entry and increases the number of products in the economy, this larger
number of products reduces the market size of each product and redirects resources away
from the quality-improving innovation of each product, which determines long-run growth.5
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. Romer (1990)
develops the seminal variety-expanding growth model in which innovation is driven by new
products, whereas Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian quality-ladder
growth model in which innovation is driven by higher-quality products. Peretto (1998,
1999) and Smulders and van de Klundert (1995) combine the two dimensions of innovation
and develop a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market structure. This study
explores the e¤ects of IPR in this vintage of the Schumpeterian growth model.
In the literature on IPR and innovation, other studies also explore the e¤ects of IPR in
the innovation-driven growth model.6 These studies mostly focus on either variety expansion
or quality improvement. Only a few studies, such as Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012) and Chu,
Furukawa and Ji (2016), explore the e¤ects of IPR in the Schumpeterian growth model with
both dimensions of innovation. However, these studies do not consider the case in which
the e¤ects of IPR can change at di¤erent stages of the economy. Iwaisako (2013), Chu,
Cozzi and Galli (2014) and Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Pan and Zhang (2019) show that the growth or
welfare e¤ects of IPR can depend on, respectively, the level of public services, the distance
to the technology frontier and the level of nancial development in the economy. However,
none of these studies consider how IPR a¤ects the endogenous take-o¤ of an economy. The
novel contributions of this study are to explore the e¤ects of IPR in a Schumpeterian growth
model of endogenous take-o¤ and to highlight the contrasting e¤ects of IPR on economic
growth at di¤erent stages of the economy with di¤erent dimensions of innovation.
This study also relates to the literature on endogenous take-o¤ and economic growth.
3See e.g., North and Thomas (1973), North (1981), Dutton (1984) and Khan (2005).
4See Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008) and Boldrin and Levine (2008) for evidence.
5See Peretto and Connolly (2007) for a theoretical explanation on quality-improving innovation being the
only plausible engine of long-run growth.
6See e.g., Cozzi (2001), Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004), Furukawa
(2007), Chu (2009), Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), Iwaisako and Futagami (2013), Cozzi and Galli (2014),
Huang et al. (2017) and Yang (2018).
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Galor and Weil (2000) provide the seminal study and develop unied growth theory,7 which
explores how the quality-quantity tradeo¤ in childrearing and human capital accumulation
allow a country to escape from the Malthusian trap and lead to the endogenous take-o¤ of
the economy.8 Peretto (2015) develops a Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous take-
o¤, which features exogenous population growth and does not capture the Malthusian trap;
instead, it describes an economy in which take-o¤ is driven by innovation, which also relates
to the industrial revolution and is suitable for our analysis of patent policy. The Peretto
model features both quality improvement and variety expansion, under which endogenous
growth in the number of products provides a dilution e¤ect that removes the scale e¤ect
of population size on long-run growth. Therefore, although the population size a¤ects the
timing of the take-o¤, it does not a¤ect the steady-state growth rate. We incorporate patent
protection into the Peretto model to explore its e¤ects on endogenous take-o¤.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
explores the e¤ects of patent policy at di¤erent stages of the economy. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian model of endogenous take-o¤
The theoretical framework is based on the Schumpeterian growth model with both variety-
expanding innovation and quality-improving innovation in Peretto (2015). In this model,
labor is used as a factor input for the production of nal good. Final good is used for
consumption and as a factor input for entry, in-house R&D, the production and operation of
intermediate goods. We incorporate a patent policy parameter into the model and analyze
its e¤ects on the take-o¤, transitional dynamics and the BGP of the economy.
2.1 Household
The representative household has a utility function given by
U =
Z 1
0
e ( )t ln ctdt, (1)
where ct  Ct=Lt denotes per capita consumption of nal good (numeraire) at time t, and
 > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Population grows at an exogenous rate  2 (0; ) with
initial population normalized to unity (i.e., Lt = et). The household maximizes (1) subject
to
_at = (rt   ) at + wt   ct, (2)
where at  At=Lt is the real value of assets owned by each member of the household, and
rt is the real interest rate. Each member supplies one unit of labor to earn wt. Standard
dynamic optimization yields
_ct
ct
= rt   . (3)
7See also Galor and Moav (2002), Weisdorf (2004), Galor and Mountford (2008), Ashraf and Galor (2011),
Galor (2011) and Desmet and Parente (2012).
8Other early studies on endogenous takeo¤ include Jones (2001) and Hansen and Prescott (2002).
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2.2 Final good
Final output Yt is produced by competitive rms using the following production function:
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)

Zt (i)Z
1 
t Lt=N
1 
t
1 
di, (4)
where f; ; g 2 (0; 1). Xt (i) is the quantity of non-durable intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt].
The productivity of Xt (i) depends on its quality Zt (i) and the average quality of all inter-
mediate goods Zt 
R Nt
0
Zt (j) dj=Nt capturing technology spillovers. The private return to
quality is determined by , and the degree of technology spillovers is determined by 1  .
The parameter 1   captures a congestion e¤ect of variety, and hence, the social return to
variety is measured by .
Prot maximization yields the following conditional demand functions for Lt and Xt (i):
Lt = (1  )Yt=wt, (5)
Xt (i) =


pt (i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t Lt=N
1 
t , (6)
where pt (i) is the price ofXt (i). Perfect competition implies that rms pay Yt =
R Nt
0
pt (i)Xt (i) di
for intermediate goods.
2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
Monopolistic rms produce di¤erentiated intermediate goods with a linear technology that
requires Xt (i) units of nal good to produce Xt (i) units of intermediate good i 2 [0; Nt].
Therefore, the marginal cost for the rm in industry i to produce Xt (i) with quality Zt (i)
is one. The rm also incurs Zt (i)Z
1 
t units of nal good as a xed operating cost. To
improve the quality of its products, the rm devotes It (i) units of nal good to in-house
R&D. The innovation process is
_Zt (i) = It (i) , (7)
and the rms (before-R&D) prot ow at time t is
t (i) = [pt (i)  1]Xt (i)  Zt (i)Z1 t . (8)
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt (i) =
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z s
t
rudu

[s (i)  Is (i)] ds. (9)
The monopolistic rm maximizes (9) subject to (7) and (8). We solve this dynamic opti-
mization problem in the proof of Lemma 1 and nd that the unconstrained prot-maximizing
markup ratio is 1=. To analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth, we introduce a policy para-
meter  > 1, which determines the unit cost for imitative rms to produce Xt (i) with the
5
same quality Zt (i)9 as the monopolistic rm in industry i.10 Intuitively, a larger patent
breadth  increases the cost of imitation and allows the monopolistic producer of Xt (i), who
owns the patents, to charge a higher markup without losing her market share to potential
imitators;11 see also Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013).
The equilibrium price becomes
pt (i) = min f; 1=g . (10)
We assume that  < 1=. In this case, increasing patent breadth raises the markup.
We follow previous studies to consider a symmetric equilibrium in which Zt (i) = Zt
for i 2 [0; Nt] and the size of each intermediate-good rm is identical across all industries
Xt (i) = Xt.12 From (6) and pt (i) = , the quality-adjusted rm size is
Xt
Zt
=



1=(1 )
Lt
N1 t
. (11)
We dene the following transformed variable:
xt  1=(1 )Xt
Zt
= 1=(1 )
Lt
N1 t
, (12)
which is a state variable determined by the quality-adjusted rm size and not directly a¤ected
by  (but indirectly via Nt). In Lemma 1, we derive the rate of return on quality-improving
R&D, which is increasing in xt and .
Lemma 1 The rate of return on quality-improving in-house R&D is13
rqt = 
t
Zt
= 

  1
1=(1 )
xt   

. (13)
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.4 Entrants
Following previous studies, we assume that entrants have access to aggregate technology Zt
to ensure symmetric equilibrium at any time t. A new rm pays Xt units of nal good to
9Alternatively, one can assume that the imitative rms have the same unit cost of production as the
incumbent monopolist but can only o¤er a lower-quality version of Xt (i) due to the monopolists patents.
10In other words, this setup implicitly assumes a knowledge di¤usion of quality improvement, perhaps via
the patents led by the monopolistic rms.
11This setup is consistent with Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) insight on patent breadth as the ability of
the patentee to raise priceand originates from the patent-design literature; e.g., Gallini (1992) also assumes
that a larger patent breadth increases the imitation cost of imitators.
12Symmetry also implies t (i) = t, It (i) = It and Vt (i) = Vt.
13Note that (  1)=1=(1 ) is increasing in  for  < 1=.
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enter the market with a new variety of intermediate goods and set up its operation.  > 0
is an entry-cost parameter. The asset-pricing equation implies that the return on assets is
rt =
t   It
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (14)
When entry is positive, free entry implies
Vt = Xt. (15)
Substituting (7), (8), (12), (15) and pt =  into (14) yields the return on entry as
ret =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
  + zt
xt

+
_xt
xt
+ zt, (16)
where zt  _Zt=Zt is the growth rate of aggregate quality.
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fAt; Yt; Ct; Xt; Itg and prices frt; wt; pt; Vtg such
that
 the household maximizes utility taking frt; wtg as given;
 competitive rms produce Yt and maximize prots taking fwt; ptg as given;
 incumbents for intermediate goods choose fpt; Itg to maximize Vt taking rt as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking Vt as given;
 the value of all existing monopolistic rms adds up to the value of the households
assets such that At = NtVt; and
 the following market-clearing condition of nal good holds:
Yt = Ct +Nt (Xt + Zt + It) + _NtXt. (17)
2.6 Aggregation
Substituting (6) and pt =  into (4) and imposing symmetry yield aggregate output as
Yt = (=)
=(1 )Nt ZtLt. (18)
The growth rate of output per capita is
gt  _yt
yt
= nt + zt, (19)
where yt  Yt=Lt denotes output per capita. Its growth rate gt is determined by both the
variety growth rate nt  _Nt=Nt and the quality growth rate zt.
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3 Dynamics of the economy
The dynamics of the economy is determined by the dynamics of xt = 
1=(1 )Lt=N1 t . Its
initial value is x0 = 
1=(1 )=N1 0 . In the rst stage of the economy, there is neither variety
expansion nor quality improvement. At this stage, xt increases solely due to population
growth. When xt becomes su¢ ciently large, innovation begins to happen. The following
inequality ensures the realistic case in which the creation of products (i.e., variety-expanding
innovation) happens before the improvement of products (i.e., quality-improving innovation).
 <
  1  (  ) 
(  ) 

+
(=) [  1  (  ) ]
1  (=) [  (  ) ]

. (20)
Variety-expanding innovation happens when xt crosses the rst threshold xN dened as
xN  
1=(1 )
  1  (  )  , (21)
which is the value of xt that yields nt = 0 when zt = 0. Then, quality-improving innovation
also happens when xt crosses the second threshold xZ dened as
xZ  arg
x
solve

  1
1=(1 )
x  
 
  
1=(1 )
x

=    (  )

, (22)
which is the value of xt that yields zt = 0 when nt > 0. The inequality in (20) implies
xN < xZ . In the long run, xt converges to its steady-state value x. The following inequalities
ensure that when the economy is on the BGP, the variables fx; z; gg are positive:
 >
1


  1  

+

1  

>   1. (23)
The following proposition adapted from Peretto (2015) summarizes the dynamics of xt.
Proposition 1 When the initial condition of the economy satises14
1=(1 )= (  1) < x0 < xN , (24)
the dynamics of xt is given by15
_xt =
8<:
xt > 0 x0  xt  xN
v (x   xt) > 0 xN < xt  xZ
v (x   xt)  0 xZ < xt  x
, (25)
where
v  1  


  1  

+

1  

,
14The inequality x0 > 1=(1 )= (  1) implies that 0 > 0.
15It can be shown that (20) and (23) imply xN < xZ < x < x.
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x  
1=(1 )
  1   [+ = (1  )] ,
v  1  


(1  ) (  1)  

+

1  

,
x  1=(1 ) (1  )  [+ = (1  )]
(1  ) (  1)   [+ = (1  )] .
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.1 Stage 1: Stagnation
When the market size is not large enough (i.e., xt  xN), there are insu¢ cient incentives
for rms to develop new products or improve the quality of existing products. In this case,
output per capita is
yt = (=)
=(1 )N0 Z0, (26)
and the growth rate of yt is gt = 0. In this regime, strengthening patent protection  de-
creases yt due to monopolistic distortion that reduces intermediate production Xt. However,
stronger patent protection also leads to an earlier (but not necessarily immediate) take-o¤
by decreasing xN in (21). Intuitively, stronger patent protection increases the protability
of rms and provides more incentives for rms to develop new products. As a result, the
economy starts to experience innovation at an earlier time.
Proposition 2 When xt  xN , stronger patent protection reduces the level of output per
capita but leads to an earlier take-o¤.
Proof. Use (21) and (26) to show that xN and yt are decreasing in . Given that xt increases
at the exogenous rate  when xt  xN , a smaller xN implies an earlier take-o¤.
3.2 Stage 2: Variety expansion
When the market size is su¢ ciently large (i.e., xt > xN), rms have incentives to develop
new products. In this case, output per capita is
yt = (=)
=(1 )Nt Z0, (27)
and the growth rate of yt is gt = nt. In the Appendix, we show that whenever nt > 0,
ct=yt always jumps to a steady state. Therefore, we can substitute ret in (16) into the Euler
equation rt = + gt = + nt in (3) and also use (12) to derive the variety growth rate as16
nt =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
  
xt

  + . (28)
16Note from (21) and (28) that nt > 0 if and only if xt > xN .
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For a given level of xt, a larger patent breadth  raises the rate of return on variety-expanding
innovation and increases the equilibrium growth rate gt = nt as in previous studies, such
as Li (2001) and ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004).
Proposition 3 For a given xt 2 (xN ; xZ), stronger patent protection increases the equilib-
rium growth rate.
Proof. Use (28) to show that gt = nt is increasing in  for a given xt.
3.3 Stage 3: Quality improvement and variety expansion
When the market size becomes even larger (i.e., xt > xZ), rms have incentives to improve
the quality of products in addition to inventing new products. Then, output per capita is
yt = (=)
=(1 )Nt Zt, (29)
and the growth rate of yt is gt = nt + zt. We can then substitute r
q
t in (13) into the Euler
equation rt = + gt = + nt + zt in (3) to derive the quality growth rate as17
zt = 

  1
1=(1 )
xt   

    nt. (30)
For a given level of xt, a larger patent breadth  raises the rate of return on quality-improving
innovation and continues to increase the equilibrium growth rate gt = nt + zt = r
q
t   ,
where rqt = 
h
 1
1=(1 )xt   
i
.
Proposition 4 For a given xt 2 (xZ ; x), stronger patent protection increases the equilib-
rium growth rate.
Proof. Use (30) to show that gt = nt + zt is increasing in  for a given xt.
3.4 Stage 4: Balanced growth path
In the long run, xt converges to x. Then, the steady-state quality growth rate is
z = 

  1
1=(1 )
x   

    n, (31)
where n = =(1  ) > 0 and
x = 1=(1 )
(1  )  [+ = (1  )]
(1  ) (  1)   [+ = (1  )] , (32)
17One can use (16) to derive nt when zt  0 and then substitute nt into (30) to show that zt > 0 if and
only if xt > xZ .
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which is decreasing in . Intuitively, stronger patent protection increases the number of
products, which leads to a smaller market size for each product. This smaller rm size x in
turn reduces the incentives for quality-improving innovation and the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate g = n+ z. This result generalizes the one in Chu et al. (2016), who assume
zero social return to variety (i.e.,  = 0).
Proposition 5 On the BGP (i.e., xt = x), stronger patent protection decreases the steady-
state equilibrium growth rate.
Proof. Use (31) and (32) to show that g = n + z is decreasing in .
3.5 Summary
We summarize the dynamics of the economy in the following gures. Figure 3 plots the
relationship between the quality-adjusted rm size xt and the equilibrium growth rate gt.
It shows that when xt is below the rst threshold xN , the economy does not grow due to
the absence of variety-expanding innovation (and also quality-improving innovation). When
xt crosses the rst threshold xN , variety-expanding innovation begins to happen. When xt
crosses the second threshold xZ , quality-improving innovation also happens. A larger patent
breadth  shifts the curve to the left giving rise to a higher growth rate for any given xt.
Figure 3: Relationship between rm size and growth
Figure 4 plots the transition path of the quality-adjusted rm size xt.18 It shows how
xt evolves from an initial state x0 to the steady state x, which is decreasing in the level
of patent breadth . Finally, Figure 5 summarizes the transition path of the equilibrium
growth rate gt and shows that strengthening patent protection leads to an earlier take-o¤
(by decreasing xN) but also lower long-run growth (by decreasing x).
18TN (TZ) is the time when variety-expanding (quality-improving) innovation is activated. In this example,
we plot the case in which TZ increases and xZ decreases, but other cases are also possible.
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Figure 4: Transition path of the rm size
Figure 5: Transition path of the growth rate
4 Conclusion
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of IPR in a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous
take-o¤ and nd that strengthening patent protection causes an earlier take-o¤by increasing
the protability of rms and providing more incentives for rms to innovate. However,
stronger patent protection eventually slows down economic growth by increasing the number
of products that reduces the market size of each product and the incentives for quality-
improving innovation. These contrasting e¤ects of IPR at di¤erent stages of the economy
are consistent with historical evidence on the industrial revolution and recent evidence on
the e¤ects of the patent system.
These results are also consistent with the fact that the UK implemented a patent system
before the US and experienced an earlier industrial revolution but eventually lower economic
growth than the US. Our analysis also addresses some critiques on the hypothesis that IPR
contributed to the occurrence of the industrial revolution; see for example, Mokyr (2009).
12
These critiques can be summarized as follows. First, the emergence of the patent system
occurred much earlier than the industrial revolution. Second, many inventions at that time
were not patented. Our analysis shows that strengthening IPR does not necessarily lead to
an immediate take-o¤ but only an earlier take-o¤. Furthermore, although our analysis does
not feature unpatented inventions, the no-arbitrage condition in a model with both patented
and unpatented inventions should imply that when the rate of return on patented inventions
increases, the rate of return on unpatented inventions also increases.
Finally, this study considers a closed economy for simplicity. In an open economy, the
strengthening of patent protection and the endogenous take-o¤ of one country may have the
following e¤ects on other countries. On the one hand, it may lead to technology spillovers to
other countries. On the other hand, it may cause the industrializing country to specialize in
industrial production and other countries to specialize in agricultural production, resulting
into a delay of their take-o¤.19 We leave this interesting extension to future research.
5 Compliance with ethical standards
The authors declare that they have no conict of interest.
19See Galor and Mountford (2008).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The current-value Hamiltonian for monopolistic rm i is
Ht (i) = t (i)  It (i) + t (i) _Zt (i) + !t (i) [  pt (i)] , (A1)
where !t (i) is the multiplier on pt (i)  . Substituting (6)-(8) into (A1), we can derive
@Ht (i)
@pt (i)
= 0) @t (i)
@pt (i)
= !t (i) , (A2)
@Ht (i)
@It (i)
= 0) t (i) = 1, (A3)
@Ht (i)
@Zt (i)
= 
(
[pt (i)  1]


pt (i)
1=(1 )
Lt
N1 t
  
)
Z 1t (i)Z
1 
t = rtt (i)  _t (i) . (A4)
If pt (i) < , then !t (i) = 0. In this case, @t (i) =@pt (i) = 0 yields pt (i) = 1=. If the
constraint on pt (i) is binding, then !t (i) > 0. In this case, we have pt (i) = . Therefore,
pt (i) = min f; 1=g . (A5)
Given that we assume  < 1= , the monopolistic rm sets its price at pt (i) = . Substituting
(A3), (12) and pt (i) =  into (A4) and imposing symmetry yield
rqt = 
t
Zt
= 

  1
1=(1 )
xt   

, (A6)
which is the rate of return on quality-improving in-house R&D.
Before we prove Proposition 1, we rst derive the dynamics of the consumption-output
ratio Ct=Yt when nt > 0.
Lemma 2 When nt > 0, the consumption-output ratio always jumps to
Ct=Yt =  (=) (  ) + 1  . (A7)
Proof. The total value of assets owned by the household is
At = NtVt. (A8)
When nt > 0, the no-arbitrage condition for entry in (15) holds. Then, substituting (15)
and XtNt = Yt into (A8) yields
At = NtXt = (=) Yt, (A9)
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which implies that the asset-output ratio At=Yt is constant. Substituting (A9), (3) and (5)
into
:
At = rtAt + wtLt   Ct yields
_Yt
Yt
=
_At
At
= rt +
wtLt
At
  Ct
At
= +
_Ct
Ct
  + (1  )

  

Ct
Yt
, (A10)
which can be rearranged as
_Ct
Ct
 
_Yt
Yt
=


Ct
Yt
  (1  )

  (  ) . (A11)
Therefore, the dynamics of Ct=Yt is characterized by saddle-point stability, such that Ct=Yt
jumps to its steady-state value in (A7).
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (12), we can derive the growth rate of xt as
_xt
xt
=   (1  )nt. (A12)
When x0  xt  xN , we have nt = 0 and zt = 0. In this case, the dynamics of xt is given by
_xt = xt. (A13)
When xN < xt  xZ , we have nt > 0 and zt = 0. In this case, Lemma 2 implies that
Ct=Yt is constant and _ct=ct = _yt=yt. Therefore, we can substitute ret in (16) and (A12) into
rt = + nt in (3) to obtain (28). Substituting (28) into (A12) yields the dynamics of xt as
_xt =
1  


1=(1 )  

  1  

+

1  

xt

. (A14)
Dening v  1 


  1    + 
1 

and x  1=(1 )
 1 (+ 1 )
, we can express (A14) as
_xt = v(x
   xt). (A15)
When xt > xZ , we have nt > 0 and zt > 0. In this case, Lemma 2 implies that Ct=Yt is
also constant, and _ct=ct = _yt=yt. Then, we use (3), (19) and _ct=ct = _yt=y to obtain
rt = + nt + zt. (A16)
Substituting ret in (16) and (A12) into (A16) yields
nt =
1=(1 )


  1
1=(1 )
  + zt
xt

  + . (A17)
We substitute (30) into (A17) to derive
nt =
[(1  ) (  1)  (  ) ] xt=1=(1 )  (1  )+ 
(xt) =1=(1 )    . (A18)
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Substituting (A18) into (A12) yields the dynamics of xt as
_xt =
1  
   1=(1 )=xt

(1  ) 

+

1  

1=(1 )  

(1  ) (  1)  

+

1  

xt

.
(A19)
Using v  1 
 1=(1 )=xt

(1  ) (  1)    + 
1 

and x in (32), we express (A19) as
_xt = v (x
   xt) , (A20)
where we approximate 1=(1 )=xt = 0 for xt > xZ , so v = 1 

(1  ) (  1)    + 
1 

becomes a constant.
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